The first is the idea of the LCS as "underpowered." The main claim here is that the LCS does not have long-range anti-ship cruise missiles, area air defense missiles, or long-range artillery to support ground soldiers. Perhaps the most laughable invocation of this claim was a piece by Time's John Sayen claiming that "Its RIM-116 lacks the range to protect other ships. Its 57mm gun is short-ranged and cannot support troops ashore." This claim is akin to criticizing the M1A2 Abrams tank because it cannot sprout wings and provide aerial close air support to ground soldiers. Like the Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates and Avenger class minesweepers it replaces, the Littoral Combat ship is designed to find, track, and destroy submarines and naval mines. Quite simply, area air defense and artillery bombardment were never the roles of frigates and minesweepers -- they are the roles of the United States Navy's Nimitz-class aircraft carriers, Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers, and Ticonderoga-class cruisers.
However, the lack of an area air defense system by no means indicate that the Littoral Combat Ship will be vulnerable to air attack. As previously mentioned, the LCS will have a RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile system to defeat incoming cruise missiles. Furthermore, Independence-class LCSs will be able to carry up to sixty-four Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles in its sixteen vertical launch tubes -- an air defense arsenal approaching that typically carried by an Arleigh Burke. The ship will carry the Nulka decoy, as well as SRBOC launchers to fire a variety of chaff, flares, and other decoys. It will be able to conduct jamming against search and targeting radars. In short, a well-equipped Littoral Combat Ship will have a very decent defense against anti-ship cruise missiles, and an Independence-class LCS will be near-indistinguishable from the Arleigh Burke in its missile loadout, except for the lack of area defense missiles.
This lack of long-range missiles will be offset by the operational nature of the Littoral Combat Ship. When in a high-threat area, conducting operations in a major war, the LCS will not by any means operate alone. Instead, the ship will operate as part of a Carrier Strike Group, much the same way as its antecedent, the Oliver Hazard Perry class FFG, does today. As a part of the group, the LCS will be protected by the Arleigh-Burkes' RIM-174 Standard ERAM area defense missiles, as well as the carrier's air defense wing. It will also have long-range surveillance provided by the carrier's E-2D Hawkeye, and will receive information via the Cooperative Engagement Capability. Because of this, the Littoral Combat Ship will receive the defense provided by the large arsenal of area air defense missiles and air combat wing that the CSG will provide, further bolstering its defensive capabilities.
The other side of the "underpowered" argument is that the LCS does not have sufficient offensive capability. When operating in the anti-submarine or anti-mine roles that they would typically find themselves in in a blue water situation, as well as in an incident involving Iran or North Korea (where the LCS would operate in tandem with CSGs), this argument would be completely fallacious, for the same reason as Sayen's statement was false -- the Littoral Combat Ship would have an anti-submarine and anti-mine role, with surface defense provided by Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and Nimitz-class aircraft carriers. In the anti-surface role, however, this is a convincing argument -- at least, on paper. The Littoral Combat Ship will carry the Griffin anti-ship missile, which does have a limited range of 3.5 miles. However, this missile will be replaced, beginning in 2017, with a new missile with beyond-the-horizon capabilities.
However, even if this missile is not implemented, a longer-ranged (but still line-of-sight) version of the Griffin missile will be fielded in 2015. This alone would be able to work as well operationally as any beyond visual range anti-ship missile. The reason a BLOS AShM would have a limited utility above and beyond a medium ranged LOS missile is that anti-pirating missions employ rigid rules of engagement. Under these rules, pirating vessels cannot be attacked until they demonstrate hostile actions, and the targeted vessel must be specifically identified. Because of these rules, as well as the tendency of pirates to not display hostile actions until they are close to their targeted ship, a beyond-line-of-sight engagement is extremely unlikely, to say the least, and thus a long-range missile is of limited utility -- you typically just do not see Navy ships firing Harpoon missiles at Somalian dhows at 100 kilometer ranges.
The other argument against the Littoral Combat Ship is that it is unsurvivable. This conjecture has its roots in a study conducted by the Navy, as well as the use of aluminum on the ship and the low number of crew deployed on it. Although the Navy study did indicate that the LCS was not expected to be survivable on its own, it did indicate that it met survivability requirements when operating as a part of a group, such as a Carrier Strike Group. Because the LCS will operate with such a group in any high-threat situation, the survivability issues prevalent only when the ship is operating alone are moot. In fact, the only case where a group of LCSs will operate without other support will be in the anti-pirating role, where survivability is not of great concern -- pirates and other marauders are armed with RPGs and AK-47s, not P-270 Moskit cruise missiles. In the low-threat anti-pirating environment where the LCS will operate alone, its survivability is entirely sufficient. Overall, the LCS will have a "Class 1+" survivability rating -- virtually equal to that of the Oliver Hazard Perry class Frigate, and greater than that of the Avenger-class minesweeper, it replaces. The addition of stealth technologies, the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile, high speed, and CEC situational awareness will further increase the survivability of this platform above and beyond that of the ships it replaces.
The other argument against the Littoral Combat Ship's survivability consists over debate about its aluminum construction. The LCS, as the argument goes, is highly vulnerable to fire damage, just as all aluminum ships are. One example often given of the danger of aluminum ships is the extensive fire damage dealt to several British ships in the Falklands conflict. However, the Littoral Combat Ship is not simply an aluminum hull. Extensive fireproofing is applied throughout the ship, which ameliorates the effects of aluminum on overall fire resistance. In fact, the Littoral Combat ship meets all Navy requirements for fire safety, just as all other Navy ships, such as the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer and the Nimitz-class carrier, do.
The third argument consists of manning issues. With a limited crew, it is often argued that the LCS will not be able to conduct damage control in the event that it is hit. One method used to offset the manning issues involves unmanned systems -- the Littoral Combat Ship includes a large array of automated fire-fighting and damage control systems. In a sense, these features make a ship "self healing" -- its on-board computer can conduct diagnostics, determine levels of damage or the severity and location of a fire, and dispatch these automated systems to repair any damage and fight fires aboard the ship. However, it has been argued that these automated systems could be disabled by damage to the ship. The systems are themselves protected from damage and include redundancies; however, at its core, this is a valid argument -- in its original manning status, the Littoral Combat Ship would be unable to effectively conduct damage control if its automated systems failed. Fortunately, the United States Navy appears to have realized this problem -- in its recent deployment to Singapore, the USS Freedom had extra berthing added for several dozen sailors, in order to provide extra manning to allow human-based damage control to be effectively carried out in combat situations. This modification to the ship's operations would be able to solve its manning issues.
There are several other arguments related to the quality of the Littoral Combat Ship. One issue has been the lack of a Prairie/Masker system to conceal it from submarines. However, the lack of this system is mainly due to a different focus on the acoustic qualities of the ship. The LCS, in accordance with its plan to incorporate stealth technologies, is much more silent than standard Navy ships. Its computer system is designed to regulate its acoustic signature, keeping it at as low a level as possible. This acoustic quietening will provide effects similar to the Prairie/Masker system in terms of hiding the ships from prowling submarines.
The final argument against the Littoral Combat Ship has been reliability issues. Although these issues make for great newspaper headlines, they do not indicate any major issue with the program. Although the LCS has experienced several engine failures, these failures are common on both commercial and military ships, and are often non-critical. For example, although the LCS did experience a loss of power, this issue was brief, and the ship was able to continue its operation. In fact, out of the eighty failures the
It is also important to remember that the Littoral Combat Ship is a prototype. The current system in no way represents the system that will enter service -- it is an early demonstration model that serves as a testbed. Much as Thomas Edison invented one hundred broken light bulbs before he achieved a working model, the Littoral Combat Ship will certainly have a number of design issues, failures, and redesigns before it enters service. To expect an early prototype to perform anywhere close to 100% perfectly, have no errors, and seamlessly integrate into service without ever needing a redesign is, in a word, asinine. The Littoral Combat Ship's failures are nothing new -- much as the LCS is today snidely referred to as the "Little Crappy Ship," the early Arleigh Burke destroyers were constantly derided as the "Always Broke" class. Similarly, the Spruance-class and Ticonderoga-class ships displayed a mountain of equipment failures and design errors early in their development. The Littoral Combat Ship, far from an exception, is just another example of the process of continually developing broken systems until a working system is eventually achieved.
This redesign and repair process has already been demonstrated. A standard Product Improvement Program was initiated by the Navy and Lockheed Martin, specifically focusing on problems with the ship's generators. Due to this program, the Mean Time Between Failures of the LCSs equipment has been tripled. As these redesigns continue, the level of errors will fall until the reach those of the rest of the Navy's in-service fleet.
In conclusion, the Littoral Combat Ship represents a game-changer in naval operations. Through the use of autonomous vessels such as the Fleet-class USV, the Littoral Combat Ship will be able to prosecute quiet diesel electric submarines much more quickly and effectively than current systems. The use of unmanned systems in ASW missions will allow the use of remotely-laid sonobuoy fields, remote towed array systems, remote active sonar systems, and multistatic sonar operations, providing a quantum leap in the detection of diesel-electric vessels. It will have sufficient protection and survivability, and will not be lacking in offensive punch in the situations it will face in combat. Issues in reliability and manning have been and will be resolved as the current prototype models progress to final service models, and the ships will lack none of the capabilities required of them. In short, the Littoral Combat Ship will be a ship of the 21st century.
